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Abstract 
This paper examines the simultaneous relationship between bank capital and risk. A 
model is set up which assumes that banks’ decisions regarding capital and risk are 
made endogenously in a dynamic pattern. A simultaneous equation system was 
estimated using an unbalanced panel of SEE banks from 2001 to 2009. A key result 
for the whole sample of banks is the relationship between regulatory (equity) capital 
and risk which is positive (negative). However, a positive two-way relationship 
between regulatory capital and risk was found only in less than-adequately capitalized 
banks, which also increased substantially their risk in 2009. Thus, banks’ decisions 
differentiate between equity capital and risk and regulatory capital and risk. A 
positive, significant and robust effect of liquidity on capital was identified. Both 
regulatory and equity capital exhibit procyclical behaviour, whilst the relationship 
between risk and rate of growth of GDP is ambitious. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the past three years banks in many advanced and emerging economies 
have responded to the challenges posed by the crisis mainly by increasing their 
capital and lowering their risk exposures in order to pave the way for a sustained 
upturn in which credit supply would not be limited by poor capitalization. In theory, 
banks can be thought of as profit maximisers which jointly determine capital and 
risk. Since raising capital comes at some cost, the concern is whether capital 
provides compensating benefits to the bank mainly when it is in excess of the capital 
requirements. Empirical research provides evidence that banks in the US and Europe 
make simultaneous choices about capital and risk and in some cases the relationship 
between the two is positive (Rime, 2001 and Jokipii and Milne, 2010). However, 
both theoretical analysis and empirical research provide conflicting predictions for 
the relationship of capital and risk. This relationship has several important policy 
implications for the banking sector and the economy as a whole, since credit crunch 
the observed in the last two years is more pervasive in countries with a bank-based 
credit system, as is the case with countries in the South-Eastern European (SEE) 
region. 
In the present study we investigate the relationship between bank capital 
(regulatory and equity) and risk in SEE countries. We want to examine the behavior 
of SEE banks in terms of choices about capital and risk over the last decade and 
mainly after the financial crisis of 2008. Due to this crisis almost all the banks in the 
SEE countries suffered heavy losses on their loan portfolios or their trading activities, 
in particular the non-traditional ones. Therefore it might be expected that they would 
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be attempting either to lower their exposures to relatively high-risk assets or to 
increase their capital in order to ensure compliance with requirements.  
More precisely, this paper uses a modified version of the simultaneous 
equations model developed by Shrieves and Dahl (1992) to analyze banks’ choice of 
capital (both regulatory and equity) and risk in seven SEE countries (Albania, 
Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYROM, Serbia, Croatia and Romania) spanning the 
period 2001-2009.  
The paper focuses on the following issues: Firstly, while a number of studies 
have examined the above relationship in the US and Europe, this is, to the best of our 
knowledge, the first attempt to estimate the relationship between bank capital and 
risk in the SEE region. Secondly, we investigate the relationship between both equity 
and regulatory capital with risk, assuming that banks differentiate in their decisions 
between equity capital and risk and between regulatory capital and risk. Thirdly, we 
estimate our model for the full sample of banks and for sub-samples according to the 
size of the equity capital-to-assets and regulatory capital-to-risk-weighted-assets 
ratios respectively. Fourthly, we consider as a control variable the index of bank 
liquidity, which is rarely used in empirical research. We also account for the effect of 
the banking reform process in the SEE countries on bank capital and risk. 
The empirical results suggest that the relationship between regulatory capital 
and risk is positive. Moreover, the significance and causation of this relation depends 
on the degree of capitalization. In less-than-adequately capitalized banks there is a 
two-way relation, while in well-capitalized banks this relation is not significant. The 
evidence confirms the assumption that banks differentiate in their decisions between 
equity capital and risk and regulatory capital and risk, since the former relation is 
negative. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews and evaluates  
recent developments in the economies and the banking industries of SEE countries. 
Section 3 outlines the theoretical and empirical literature. Section 4 presents the 
specification of the model. Section 5 describes the data and the determinants of 
capital and risk, while Section 6 describes the econometric methodology. Section 7 
reports and analyses the empirical results. Conclusions and some policy suggestions 
are offered in the final section. 
 
2. Economic development in the SEE countries and the 
banking industry 
 
During the last decade, SEE countries have made significant steps towards 
their main target to become full EU members. Their banking sectors have undergone 
profound changes during the past twenty years. Countries in the region each 
progressed at a difference pace each and with considerable difficulties and setbacks, 
to the liberalization of their banking systems. The process included the privatization 
of state-owned banks, most of which were acquired by foreign banks, and the de 
novo entry of foreign banks (foreign ownership is high and ranges from 75% in 
Serbia to 93% in Albania). The credit system in these countries is still in the 
intermediate stages of development with respect to the depth and scope consistent 
with their respective stage of economic development. However, financial 
intermediation in those countries is converging fast. Over the last five years 
significant efforts have been made to bring the SEE countries’ regulatory framework 
in line with EU directives and the Basel Core Principles. Before the crisis, the SEE 
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banking sector was characterized by sufficient capitalization and benign levels of 
credit risk.  
The recent financial crisis has hit these countries hard since the heightened 
risk aversion of investors towards the SEE region and ‘flight to quality’ frenzy led to 
a significant increase in risk premiums. The crisis affected the SEE countries’ 
banking system in a rather severe way for the following reasons: 
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• The fall in GDP growth (Figure 1 in Appendix) has led to an increase in the ratio 
of non-performing loans to total loans (NPLs, Figure 1). In fact, the probability 
that a loan becomes non-performing is higher in these countries compared with 
advanced economies. 
• NPLs also increased due to the fact that many loans were denominated in foreign 
currencies and local currencies have depreciated.  
• High lending rates on the back of increasing risks. 
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• Property prices plummeted, reducing banks’ collateral value. 
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The SEE countries were able to avoid the worst-case outcome of a systemic 
crisis, due to the relative soundness of their banking sectors (Figure 2), the relatively 
low reversals in net capital flows and the support from international 
organizations/initiatives (the Vienna Initiative, the World Bank, the EU and the 
IMF). Thanks to this support, their financial sector is in a better condition now than 
at the end of 2008 (Figure 2 and Appendix Figure 2), although, significant risk still 
lie ahead. It is worth noting that, although banks in the SEE countries increased their 
minimum capital adequacy ratio to 10.29% on average (Table 1) at the end of 2009, 
Table 1 
Minimum Capital Adequacy Ratio (end of 2009) 
Countries Capital Adequacy Ratio (%) 
Albania 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
FYROM 
Romania 
Serbia 
12 
12 
12 
10 
8 
10 
8 
Average 10.29 
Source: EBRD (2010): “Transition Report 2009” 
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their actual ratio remained well above that, standing on average at almost 15% 
(Figure 3). 
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
Al
ba
nia
Bo
sn
ia-
He
rze
go
vin
a
Bu
lga
ria
FY
RO
M
M
on
te
ne
gr
o
Ro
ma
nia
Se
rb
ia
Cr
oa
tia
Av
er
ag
e
Figure 3
Bank Regulatory Capital to RWA in SEE
2007
2008
2009
Source: EBRD (2010): "Transition Report 2009"
 
 
This comfortable level of capitalization provided adequate protection against shocks 
originating in the domestic economy and the banking system. 
 
 
3. Literature review 
                                      3.1 Theoretical literature 
 
The relationship between capital and risk has important implications for the 
implementation of the Basel II capital adequacy requirement. Theoretically, the 
relationship between capital and risk in the banking sector is ambiguous.  
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A bank may choose to increase its risk alongside its capital levels, since 
increased risk leads to higher insolvency probability. The theory of the bank as a 
mean-variance portfolio manager generates a positive relationship between capital 
requirements and risk (Koehn and Santomero, 1980, Kim and Santomero, 1988)1. 
However, increased capital regulation can reduce portfolio risk if risk weights are 
chosen to be proportional to, for example, the systemic risks of the assets (market-
based risk weights). 
The theory of the deposit insurance has shown that when deposit insurance 
underprices risk, banks seeking to increase capital will increase risk as well (Merton, 
1977, Sharpe, 1978, and Dothan and Williams, 1980). However, if the marginal value 
of deposit insurance option with respect to risk is increasing, then more regulatory 
capital will reduce risk (Furlong and Keeley, 1989), thus generating a negative 
relationship. 
Studies based on the charter (or franchise) value2 theory argue that an 
increase in bank capital is unambiguously associated with a reduction in the level of 
bank asset risk (Markus, 1984, Matutes and Vives, 2000). 
The capital buffer theory suggests that the relationship between capital and 
risk varies with how close banks are to the minimum capital requirements. This 
theory demonstrates that a bank will choose to hold capital above the minimum 
capital requirements since there are (implicit and explicit) costs of falling below 
them. Therefore banks with capital levels close to (or below) the minimum capital 
requirements will choose to increase their capital and lower their risk levels, while 
                                                 
 
1 However, Keeley and Frulong (1991) show that the mean-variance portfolio model is inappropriate to 
analyze the effect of capital regulation on the risk of bank failure, because of the model’s assumption 
of constant borrowing rates and costs are independent of portfolio risk. They suggest that increased 
capital will not cause banks to increase risk. 
2 The charter value is the present value of expected future rents. 
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banks with sizeable capital buffers will increase their levels of risk along with their 
capital buffer level (Milne and Whaley, 2001, and  VanHoose, 2007). 
Finally, the industrial organization approach argues that holding capital is 
more costly than the risk-free interest rate, thus increasing capital (by capital 
regulation) induces a bank to become more risk-averse and vice versa (Saunders et 
al., 1990).          
 
                          3.2 Empirical literature 
 
The capital-risk relationship in the banking industry has been examined for 
various countries in several empirical papers. For US banks, Jokipii and Milne 
(2010) find a negative capital-buffer-risk relationship for banks with marginal capital 
adequacy and a positive one for highly capitalized banks. Similarly, a negative 
relationship was found by Aggarwal and Jacques (2001). However, Berger et al. 
(2008) and Shrieves and Dahl (1992) find a positive one, indicating that banks that 
increased their target capital have also increase their risk exposure. However, this 
relationship is not strictly the result of regulatory influence since it holds even in 
banks with capital in excess of the minimum regulatory capital requirement. For six 
G10 countries (Canada, France, Italy, Japan, UK and the USA), Van Roy (2008) 
finds that weakly capitalized banks did not modify the ratio of risk-weighted assets 
to total assets differently from well-capitalized banks. Lindguist (2004) argues for a 
negative capital buffer-risk relationship for Norwegian banks. Finally, for Swiss 
banks, Rime (2001) shows that regulatory pressure affects the level of capital, but 
not the level of risk, and finds a positive relationship between capital ratio and risk. 
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4. Model specification and sample separation 
4.1 Model specification 
 
In this analysis, we assume that bank capital and risk decisions are taken 
simultaneously. The observed levels of capital and risk in any bank consist of two 
components : one is managed internally by the bank and a second is an exogenous 
random shock. Hence, the present study deviates from previous literature (e.g. 
Shrieves and Dahl, 1992, Jacques and Nigro, 1997) which assume that banks decide 
on changes in capital and risk. However, we preserve the core of this literature and 
we assume that actual bank capital and risk adjust to their long-run target levels. In 
turn, due to exogenous shocks, this adjustment is costly (or sometimes infeasible), 
preventing banks from a fully contemporaneous adjustment of capital and risk. Thus, 
our model assumes that actual capital and risk follow a partial adjustment process, 
defined by:  
∆CAPi,t   = λ1 (CAPi, t* - CAPi,t-1)      + εi,t         ,                           (1) 
              ∆RISKi,t  =λ2 (RISK i, t* - RISKi,t-1)   +  ei,t         ,                          (2) 
Where ∆ represents first differences, CAPi,t  and Riski,t are observed capital 
and risk levels respectively for bank i in period t, CAPi, t*  and RISK i, t* are the target 
levels of capital and risk respectively, εi,t and ei,t are random shocks and 0≤ λ1 ≤1 and 
0≤ λ2≤1  are the speeds of adjustment of actual levels of capital and risk to their 
targets, respectively. 
The model further assumes that the long-term target level of capital and risk 
is determined by a set of explanatory control variables, Z and H respectively, which 
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include bank specific determinants (including CAPi,t in the risk equation and 
RISKi,t in the capital equation) as well as industry specific and macroeconomic 
determinants: 
CAPi, t*   = λjZi, t +  ε΄i, t,                              (3) 
RISK i, t* = λhHi, t +  e΄i, t,                             (4) 
where λj  and λh  are the vectors of coefficients of the Zi, t  and  Hi, t vectors of 
variables respectively. 
Therefore, the final dynamic system of equations to be estimated takes the form:  
CAPi, t = αο+α1CAP i,t-1 + ∑
=
j
i 2
 αiZi,t + ηi,t ,                         (5) 
RISKi, t = βο+β1RISK i,t-1+ ∑
=
k
i 2
βiH i,t +wi,t ,              (6) 
where α1=1- λ1,  αi= βiλj,  β1=1-λ2   and  βi=βiλh. 
4.2 Sample separation 
 
The system of equations (5) and (6) will be estimated for the full sample and 
for sub-samples according to the following two criteria: Firstly, using the average 
equity-to-assets ratio (EA), we obtain high and low equity capital banks respectively. 
Secondly, using the average regulatory capital ratio (CAR), we obtain sub-samples 
of the high and low regulatory capital banks, respectively. 
Therefore, the system of equations (5) and (6) will be estimated for the full 
sample and for the above four (4) sub-samples. 
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5. Sample descriptions and determinants of capital and risk in the 
SEE region 
 
5.1 The Data 
 
We use annual bank-level and macroeconomic data for seven SEE countries 
(Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM, Romania and Serbia) 
over the period 2001-2009. The dataset is unbalanced and covers approximately 85% 
of the industry’s total assets (including 70 banks in 2001 up to 115 banks in 2009, 
representing a total of 895 observations). 
The bank variables are obtained from the BankScope database. We focus on 
banks with unconsolidated accounts using the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) for the whole period. The macroeconomic variables are obtained 
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) and the banking reform index 
from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Table 2 lists 
the variables used to proxy capital and risk and their determinants as well as notation 
and the expected effect of the determinants according to the literature. 
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Table 2 
Definitions, notation and expected effects of the explanatory variables of bank 
capital and risk 
 
 Variable Measure Notation Expected Value 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
 
 
Capital (CAP) 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk 
 
 
 
Equity/Assets 
 
Total Regulatory 
Capital Ratio 
 
 
Impaired Loans 
/Gross Loans 
 
 
 
EA   
 
CAR 
     
 
 
NPL         
 
               
Capital Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D
et
er
m
in
an
ts
 
 
 
Liquidity 
 
 
 
Profitability 
 
 
Size 
 
 
 
Loan Losses 
 
 
 
Banking reforms 
 
Economic activity 
 
 
Liquid 
Assets/deposits and 
s-t funding 
 
Net Profits (before 
taxes) /Average 
Assets 
 
   Ln(real assets)  
Ln(real assets)2 
 
 
Loan Loss 
Provisions /Gross 
Loans 
 
EBRD index 
 
 
Rate of growth of 
GDP 
 
 
 
LIQ 
 
 
 
ROA 
 
 
       S  
S2 
 
 
LLP 
 
 
 
EBRD 
 
 
GDPR 
 
 
 
Negative/ 
Positive 
 
 
Positive 
 
 
 
Negative 
 
 
 
Positive 
 
 
 
Negative 
 
 
Negative 
 
 
 
Positive/ 
Negative 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
Positive 
 
 
 
Negative 
 
 
 
Negative 
 
 
Negative 
 
 
Table 3 presents country and region averages. For the whole region, the 
period-average capital ratio is 18.6 and 25.6 for EA and CAR respectively, while the 
average LLP and NPL are 2.89 and 4.72 respectively. 
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Table 3 
 Descriptive Statistics  
  
ALBANIA BULGARIA BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA CROATIA FYROM ROMANIA SERBIA 
EA* MEAN 9,37 12,96 11,85 11,84 21,51 0,13 18,94 
 S.DV. 1,14 1,67 2,27 1,93 9,63 0,03 4,50 
CAR* MEAN 17,34 23,25 24,36 22,49 24,38 31,64 25,88 
 S.DV. 4,43 7,95 4,11 2,33 12,46 16,43 8,54 
ROA* MEAN 0,85 1,14 1,27 1,10 1,07 1,22 1,20 
 S.DV. 0,50 0,09 0,39 0,07 0,35 0,27 0,18 
LLPs* MEAN 0,97 0,80 2,04 0,59 2,40 1,06 6,04 
 S.DV. 0,48 0,66 1,17 0,16 3,84 1,20 4,04 
NPL* MEAN 4,26 8,50 5,00 6,37 1,59 2,60 2,89 
 S.DV. 4,29 7,64 3,22 3,04 1,67 3,22 4,62 
LIQ* MEAN 50,66 62,98 59,81 50,34 57,91 58,09 56,23 
 S.DV. 19,72 21,57 19,94 13,46 16,10 18,50 13,26 
S MEAN 9,77 7,04 6,10 9,00 8,23 8,34 10,06 
 S.DV. 0,52 0,85 0,76 0,25 0,73 0,55 0,82 
S2 MEAN 95,47 49,55 37,20 80,94 67,76 69,61 101,14 
 S.DV. 0,27 0,72 0,57 0,06 0,54 0,30 0,68 
GDPR MEAN 5,62 4,28 4,44 4,36 2,40 4,42 4,51 
 S.DV. 1,45 3,57 3,14 0,93 3,30 4,48 3,23 
EBRD MEAN 2,70 3,70 5,30 4,35 4,00 3,00 5,40 
 S.DV. 0,28 0,26 3,14 0,93 3,30 0,26 3,23 
For the notation of the variables see Table 2. Variables with an asterisk are percentages 
EA=Equity/Assets ratio , CAR=Total Regulatory Capital ratio , ROA= Return over Assets, 
LLP=Loan Loss Provisions over Gross Loans, NPL=Impaired Loans to Gross Loans ratio, 
LIQ=liquid assets/deposits and s-t funding, S=ln(real assets), GDPR=rate of growth of 
GDP, EBRD=banking reform index. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Bank-specific determinants 
 
Capital: Two alternative measures are used to proxy this variable (CAP). 
First, the total capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and second the equity to assets (EA) 
ratio. CAR has been used by Shrieve and Dahl (1992), Jacques and Nigro (1997) 
and Aggarwal and Jacques (1998). While CAR is the definition of capital used by 
regulators, the one used by banks might be different, such as the market value of 
capital, the book equity or the economic capital.   
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Risk: There is no consensus in the literature about the appropriate measure of 
bank risk3. In the present study, in order to capture the asset risk of banks, we use 
the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans (NPL)4. This measure captures 
those bank loans that are actually in default. In addition, it is not much influenced by 
changes in accounting standards. However, it should be noted that since this proxy is 
an ex post measure of risk. Also, this proxy is used in theoretical models that 
consider loan defaults as the main source of bank instability (Martines-Miera and 
Repullo, 2010). 
Size: One of the most important questions underlying bank policy is which 
size optimizes bank capital and risk. Generally, it is expected that the effect of  
growing size on risk is negative (that is, larger banks are safer), since larger banks 
can diversify their asset portfolios, enhance their investment opportunities and 
achieve lower levels of capital since they can raise funds from the markets. This 
diversification effect could reduce credit and liquidity risk. 
However, for larger banks, the effect of size could be negative for 
bureaucratic and other reasons (diseconomies of scale). Hence, the size-capital and 
risk relationship may be expected to be non-linear (Athanasoglou et al., 2008). The  
logarithm of real bank’s assets and their square is used in order to capture potential 
nonlinearities. Overall, the SEE banking sector includes small financial institutions 
with limited country coverage. 
Profitability: Profitability may have a positive effect on bank target capital if 
banks increase capital through retained earnings rather than through equity issues. 
The former increases the banks’ value in the market, while the latter, if interpreted as 
                                                 
 
3 See Beck, 2008, for a survey of alternative measures of bank risk. 
4 See also Shrieves and Dahl, 1992 and Aggrarwal and Jaques, 1998, among others, who proxy risk by 
this variable. 
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“a signal of weakness”, may reduce it. The relation between equity capital and 
profitability is considered systemic and positive, since higher profits can lead to an 
increase in capital (Athanasoglou, et al., 2006, Berger, 1995). However, the relation 
between profitability and regulated capital may not be significant or positive if 
capital requirements are binding, since in this case banks will hold more economic 
capital and will be less profitable. Thus, the expected sign on the coefficient of this 
variable can be either positive or negative. The bank’s returns on assets (ROA)5 
are included in the equity capital equation with an expected positive coefficient and 
in the regulatory capital equation with an ambiguous one. 
Liquidity: An important role of a bank in the economy is to create liquidity 
(Berger and Bowman, 2009). Indeed, as the last crisis shows, illiquidity and poor 
asset quality were the main causes of bank failures. Despite the importance of bank 
liquidity there is disagreement in the literature about its measurement. An often used 
measure of liquidity is the ratio of loans to deposits. In the present study, we measure 
liquidity as the ratio of liquid assets to customer deposits and short-term 
funding. Liquid assets include: 1) trading securities and at fair value through 
income, 2) loans and advances to banks, and 3) cash and due from banks. In the 
denominator the following items are included: 1) customer deposits (sight and term): 
2) deposits from banks, and 3) other deposits and short-term borrowing. There are 
surprisingly few empirical studies that focus on the effect of liquidity on capital and 
risk. Jokipii and Milne (2010) argue that banks with higher liquidity can decrease 
their capital and increase their levels of risk. However, banks may hold liquidity as 
self-insurance against liquidity shocks. In turn, high levels of liquidity expose banks, 
                                                 
 
5 For the calculation of this ratio, we use the average values of assets of two consecutive years and not 
the end-year values, since profits are a flow variable generated during the year. 
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mainly small ones, to risk-taking (Allen and Gale, 2003) leading to increasing levels 
of capital in order to control risk-taking. Therefore, in this case, the effect of 
liquidity on capital will be positive. In some cases liquidity requirements can be as 
effective as capital requirements. 
Loan losses: Loan losses affect capital positively, since banks with expected 
increased loses will raise their capital (regulatory and equity) in order to reduce risk. 
The effect of loan losses on risk is expected to be negative, since increased loan 
losses will induce banks to lower their risk exposure. These losses are approximated 
by the loans-loss provisions to gross loans (LLP) ratio. 
 
5.3 Industry-specific determinants 
 
The EBRD index: This index represents banking system reform in the SEE 
countries and identifies progress in areas such as: 1) the adoption of regulation 
according to international standards and practices. 2) the implementation of tighter 
and more efficient supervision. 3) the privatization of state-owned banks and 4) the 
write-off of non-performing loans and the closure of insolvent banks. 
 
5.4 Macroeconomic determinants 
 
GDPR: The annual growth rate of gross domestic product of each SEE 
country is included in both capital and risk equations to capture the effect of the 
macroeconomic environment. 
 
 
18 
6. Econometric methodology 
 
We assume a one-way error component model. Thus, in (5) and (6) the error 
terms ηi,t  and wi,t, include the unobserved bank-specific effect and the idiosyncratic 
error respectively. Moreover, due to the differences that exist between the banking 
system of different SEE countries and also the effects of the last crisis, we should 
test for potential cross-country and time effects. We test for these effects by 
including in equations (5) and (6) country- and time-specific dummies, respectively. 
Thus, the econometric system is expanded as follows: 
CAPis,t = αο+α1CAP is,t-1 + tis
J
i
iZa ,
2
∑
=
 + ∑
−
=
1
1
1
s
i
iγ Ds-1+ηis,t           ,                    (7) 
RISKis, t = βο+β1RISK is,t-1+ tis
k
i
iH ,
2
∑
=
β  + ∑
−
=
1
1
2
s
i
iγ  Ds-1+w is,t        ,              (8) 
ηis,t=µ is +vis, t+λ t  , 
wis,t=u is +φis, t+λ t , 
Where Ds-1 stands for the country-specific dummy variables, s stands for countries 
with s=1,…,S and λt accounts for the unobservable time effect. 
The significance of the time effects is tested with the relevant LM test which 
implies that we should include a year-specific dummy variable to account for λt. It 
turns out that the dummy variables for the year 2009 (D9) in some cases is 
significant. Therefore, equations (7) and (8) are expanded as follows: 
CAPis,t = αο+α1CAP is,t-1 + tis
J
i
iZa ,
2
∑
=
 
 +∑
−
=
−
1
1
11
s
i
siDγ  +δ1D9+ηis,t,                 (9) 
RISKis, t = βο+β1RISK is,t-1+ tis
k
i
iH ,
2
∑
=
β  + 1
1
1
2 −
−
=
∑ s
s
i
iDγ  + δ2D9+w is,t,            (10)  
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The dynamic system of equations (9) and (10) will be estimated by the one-
step and the two-step system GMM estimates (Blundell and Bond, 1998). We use the 
two-step robust estimates unless the Sargan test rejects the null hypothesis that the 
moment conditions are valid. Since in this case standard errors are downward biased, 
the robust estimator suggested by Windmeijier (2005) is used. However, in case that 
the lagged dependent variable is insignificant, the two stages least squares 
instrumental variables with random effects (2SLS-RE) method6 will be used with the 
Baltagi-Chang (1994) estimators of the variance components. We also test for the 
endogeneity of risk in the capital equation and capital in the risk equation using the 
Wu-Hausman test statistic. Thus, we do not follow the literature by including shift 
parameters for the four sub-samples and using a fixed effects method, but rather we 
allow the slope coefficients to vary across the four sub-samples. 
                             
                                7. Results 
                     7.1 Full sample results 
 
The variables are defined in Table 2. Table 4 presents correlations of the 
main variables in levels. The correlation between regulatory capital and risk appears 
to be positive but small in size, while the relationship between equity capital and risk 
is negative. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
6 The Hausman test, for the whole sample, provides evidence in favour of a RE model ( x2(11)=15.68, 
with p-value=0.49) 
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     Table 4 
                  Correlation matrix of the variables                                                                                          
                                       
 
Table 5 reports the results obtained from the estimation of the simultaneous 
equations model (9) and (10) for the full sample. The first two columns present the 
estimated capital equation (equation (9)) when the dependent variable (CAP) is 
either the total regulatory capital ratio (CAR) or the equity to assets ratio (EA). The 
next two columns of Table 5 present the estimated risk equation (equation (10)) 
either when capital is measured by CAR or by EA.    
        In the CAR equation (first column) our findings indicate a static regulatory 
capital equation and a positive but statistically insignificant relation between risk and 
capital. The Wu-Hausman test confirms that the two variables are endogenous. 
However, in the EA equation (second column) the short-run impact of capital on bank 
risk is negative and statistically significant (-0.46), while the long-run impact appears 
to be close to -1.  Even during the last crisis, banks in the SEE countries managed to 
absorb the increased risk by reducing their equity capital but with an (insignificant)  
 
 
 
 EA CAR ROA NPL LLP LIQ GDPR EBRD S S2 D9 
EA 1.00           
CAR 0.58 1.00          
ROA 0.08 -0.06 1.00         
NPL -0.09 0.04 -0.09 1.00        
LLP 0.14 0.09 -0.64 0.00 1.00       
LIQ 0.30 0.53 0.12 -0.03 0.01 1.00      
GDPR 0.50 0.02 0.11 -0.21 0.15 0.04 1.00     
EBRD -0.06 -0.08 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.001 1.00    
S -0.24 -0.17 0.06 -0.02 0.04 -0.19 -0.08 0.06 1.00   
S2 -0.21 -0.15 0.06 -0.01 0.05 -0.17 -0.08 0.05 0.99 1.00  
D9 -0.55 0.02 -0.10 0.22 -0.11 -0.03 -0.93 0.008 0.11 0.11 1.00 
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Table 5 
          Estimation results for the simultaneous equation model 
          (Full sample) 
 
 
 
Dependent variables 
Capital Risk 
CAP(=CAR) CAP(=EA) NPL(CAP=CAR) NPL(CAP=EA) 
Methods 
2SLS-RE System GMM 2SLS-RE System GMM 
 
Explanatory 
variables 
coefficient t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. 
CAPt     0.08** 1.91 -0.01 -0.11 
CAPt-1   0.75*** 5.02     
NPLt 0.28 0.53 -0.46*** -2.27     
NPLt-1       0.23** 2.04 
ROA 0.85 1.40 0.80* 1.79     
LIQ 0.12*** 3.59 -0.01 -0.29 -0.03* -1.68 0.01 0.39 
LLP 0.45 1.41 0.46 1.21 -0.01 -0.16 0.12 0.33 
S 4.52 0.99 5.02 0.69 -4.18*** -2.66 -7.03 -1.28 
S2 -0.35 -1.24 -0.38 -0.76 0.25*** 2.58 0.48 1.33 
GDPR -0.23 -0.70 -0.05 -0.24 0.39** 1.91 0.07 0.35 
EBRD -0.02 -0.19 0.17 1.42 0.03 0.31 0.10* 1.81 
D9 -0.50 -0.13 1.85 0.80 5.29*** 2.47 3.19* 1.66 
Wu-Hausman-
test1 
3.09 
(0.08) 
 0.92 
(0.24) 
 2.21 
(0.12) 
 2.31 
(0.11) 
 
Wald-test 73  166  53  275  
Sargan-test2   44.74 (0.36) 
   35.77 
(0.73) 
 
AR(1)3   -3.01 (0.00) 
   -1.20 
(0.22) 
 
AR(2)3   -0.19 (0.84) 
   0.60 
(0.54) 
 
R2(overall) 0.19    0.27    
Note: For the notation of the variables see Table 2. 
          *, **, *** Significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels of significance respectively. 
          The country dummies (Ds-1) and the constant are not reported. 
          1. Test for the endogeneity of risk in the capital equation and vice versa, with 
              p-values in parentheses. 
          2. Test for over-identifying restrictions, with p-values in parentheses. 
          3. First and second order autocovariance in residuals, with p-values in  
              parentheses.                                             
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increase in the regulatory capital7. The above result is in accordance with previous 
findings by Aggarwal and Jacques (2000), Rime (2000), Van Roy (2004) and Jokipii 
and Milne (2010). 
The empirical results show that liquidity causes banks to hold more regulatory 
capital (CAR equation). Loan loss provisions have a positive, as expected, but 
insignificant impact on capital, indicating that banks will cover their loan losses by 
increasing their regulatory capital in order to comply with their capital requirements. 
Although not being significant the negative coefficient of the growth rate of GDP is a 
robust result in all the estimated samples. Berger et al. (1995) explain this relationship 
with the argument that banks hold high levels of capital to be able to exploit 
unexpected investment opportunities. The estimated coefficients of the remaining 
variables have the correct signs but are all insignificant.  
In the equity capital (EA) equation, the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable CAP i,t-1 is highly significant and denotes a fast speed of capital adjustment 
of 75% per year8. The impact of risk on equity capital appears to be negative and 
significant. The relationship between profitability and capital is positive, as in the 
case of regulatory capital, but here is significant. This finding is not surprising in 
light of previous research regarding the SEE countries (Athanasoglou et al., 2006) 
and implies that the benefits associated with increasing profits are offset by costs of 
increasing regulatory capital, while in the equity capital case, retained profits add to 
capital. The coefficients of the remaining variables are insignificant. It is worth 
noting that the coefficients of the NPL an LLP variables in this equation are opposite 
                                                 
 
7 Note that CAR is a truncated variable not a continuous one, since it cannot be reduced below its 
minimum. 
8 This is higher than reported for large USA banks by Berger et al. (2008). 
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in sign to those in the CAR equation, indicating that banks’ capital and risk decisions 
differentiate between regulatory and equity capital. 
The risk equation with regulatory capital is static with the impact of 
regulatory capital on risk being positive and significant, indicating that banks with 
higher levels of capital will engage in higher risk-taking. The coefficient of loans 
losses is, as expected, negative but insignificant. The negative and significant 
coefficient of liquidity appears to suggest that this variable is associated with lower 
risk. The effect of size on risk is significant, suggesting that to a certain extent 
increasing size reduces risk although for extremely large banks it is associated with 
increasing risk. The estimated coefficient of the growth rate of GDP reflects, 
contrary to expectations, a counter-cyclical behaviour of risk. Finally, the adverse 
conditions that banks faced in 2009 increased risk significantly as indicated by the 
positive and significant coefficient on D9. 
In contrast to the previous case, the risk equation with equity capital is 
dynamic. The estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable indicates a 
rather slow speed of risk adjustment, in fact substantially slower than in the equity 
capital equation9. The estimated coefficient on capital is negative but highly 
insignificant. The EBRD index has a positive and significant impact on risk, 
suggesting that reforms induce banks to take higher risks. 
      
 
7.2 Results for high equity capital banks 
 
 
Results for estimating equations (11) and (12) for the sub-sample of high 
equity banks are presented in Table 6. The estimated equations of (both regulatory 
                                                 
 
9 See also Jokipii and Milner (2010), for similar results. 
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Table 6 
          Estimation results for the simultaneous equation model 
          (High equity capital banks) 
 
 
 
Dependent variables 
Capital Risk 
CAP(=CAR) CAP(=EA) NLP(CAP=CAR) NLP(CAP=EA) 
Methods System GMM System GMM 2SLS-RE 2SLS-RE 
 
Explanatory 
variables 
coefficients t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. 
CAPt     -0.02 -0.38 -0.12* -1.72 
CAPt-1 0.57*** 3.09 0.45* 1.71     
NPLt 0.92 1.64 -0.21 -0.06     
NPLt-1         
ROA -0.87 -0.49 1.21 0.53     
LIQ 0.07* 1.74 0.01 0.16 -0.02 -1.06 -0.01 -0.57 
LLP 0.58 0.37 0.66 1.00 -0.01 -0.17 0.01 0.13 
S 17.9 0.68 30.75 0.44 -5.01*** -2.25 -4.4** -1.99 
S2 -0.85 -0.43 -2.19 -0.45 0.33*** 2.23 0.28** 1.90 
GDPR -2.7* -1.77 -0.71 -0.30 0.19 0.60 0.02 0.08 
EBRD -0.21 -1.15 0.35*** 2.40 -0.11 -0.87 -0.07 -0.56 
D9 -26.2 -1.48 -4.05 -0.16 4.37 1.37 2.98 0.91 
Wu-Hausman-
test1 
0.88 
(0.35) 
 0.76 
(0.31) 
 0.15 
(0.70) 
 0.11 
(0.73) 
 
Wald-test 168  107  16  19  
Sargan-test2 42.7 (0.40) 
 9.98 
(1.00) 
     
AR(1)3 -1.96 (0.04) 
 -1.03 
(0.30) 
     
AR(2)3 0.20 (0.25) 
 -0.29 
(0.77) 
     
R2(overall)     0.17  0.14  
Note: For the notation of the variables see Table 2. 
          *, **, *** Significance  at the 10, 5 and 1% levels of significance respectively. 
          The country dummies (Ds-1) and the constant are not reported. 
          1. Test for the endogeneity of risk in the capital equation and vice versa, with 
              p-values in parentheses. 
          2. Test for over-identifying restrictions, with p-values in parentheses. 
          3. First and second order autocovariance in residuals, with p-values in  
              parentheses.                                             
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(CAR) and equity (EA)) capital appear to be dynamic, while those of risk 
appear to be static. Thus, as opposed to the whole sample case actual regulatory 
capital of high equity banks adjust partially to their target (long-run) levels, while the 
adjustment of risk is instantaneous. In the CAR equation the impact of risk on capital 
is positive but not significant. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is 
significant, indicating a fast speed of adjustment. Liquidity has a positive and 
significant impact on capital. The negative and significant coefficient…of the rate of 
growth of GDP appears to reflect the procyclical nature of bank regulatory capital in 
this sub-sample. 
 In the equity capital equation, the impact of risk is negative but statistically 
insignificant. The speed of capital adjustment is lower than in the regulatory capital 
case. Among the remaining variables, only the EBRD index takes a significant and 
contrary to expectations-positive coefficient. 
In the risk equation, the coefficient on regulatory capital is negative but insignificant. 
In fact, size is the only significant determinant of risk among all the explanatory 
variables in this equation. This result suggests that larger banks maintain a lower level 
of risk up to a point. Equity capital has a negative and marginally significant impact 
on risk, in line with the negative relation in the equity capital equation. From the 
remaining control variables, only size has a negative and non-linear impact on risk, 
indicating that higher equity banks take on lower levels of risk. 
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7.3 Results for low equity capital banks 
 
 
Our (static) estimates for the sub-sample of low equity banks show (Table 7) 
that the relationship between risk and regulatory capital (first column) is positive and 
significant but lower than it was with that of high equity banks. This finding is 
expected since in this sub-sample banks would have to increase capital in 
compliance with existing compulsory capital requirements or even above them. 
Jokipii and Milne (2010) argue that higher risk-taking can increase the probability of 
default and encourage banks to increase regulatory capital. The estimated coefficient 
on liquidity, as in the last two cases, is positive and significant. Both coefficients on 
the size variables are significant, suggesting that low equity banks, probably due to 
high cost, choose to reduce regulatory capital, if it is well above the minimum in the 
initial stages of their development, and increase it when they reach a certain size. 
 The relationship between equity capital and risk (second column) is negative 
but insignificant. In this equation, profitability and reforms are associated with 
higher and lower equity capital respectively, with significant coefficients as opposed 
to the regulatory capital case.  
In the risk equation, the impact of regulatory capital appears to be positive 
and significant. Thus, up to now this is the only case where the estimations indicate a 
two-way positive relation between capital and risk. However, the estimated 
coefficients of the remaining variables are insignificant. The relationship between 
risk and equity capital in this sub-sample appears to be negative and insignificant. 
The estimated coefficient on loan losses is positive and highly significant, suggesting 
that banks with higher loan losses increase risk-taking. The rate of growth of GDP, 
contrary to expectations, has a positive and significant coefficient.  
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Table 7 
          Estimation results for the simultaneous equation model 
(low equity capital banks) 
 
 
 
Dependent variables 
Capital Risk 
CAP(=CAR) CAP(=EA) NPL(CAP=CAR) NPL(CAP=EA) 
Methods 2SLS-RE System GMM 2SLS-RE 2SLS-RE 
 
Explanatory 
variables 
coefficients t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. 
CAPt     0.38* 1.73 -0.01 -0.04 
CAPt-1   0.44** 1.91     
NPLt       0.35** 1.96  -0.01 -0.12     
NPLt-1         
ROA -0.03 -0.08    0.52*** 2.22     
LIQ      0.04** 1.81   -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -1.28 0.02 1.18 
LLP -0.10 -0.46    0.00 0.02 0.14 0.58 0.78*** 3.55 
S       -6.40*** -2.38    1.39 0.53 -1.95 -0.63 3.49 1.11 
S2       0.41*** 2.49   -0.08 -0.45 0.12 0.62 -0.22 -1.14 
GDPR        -0.19 -0.78   -0.05 -0.31 0.32 1.18 0.64*** 2.99 
EBRD -0.07 -0.97  -0.04*** -2.49 0.05 0.58 0.03 0.51 
D9 -1.83 -0.65    0.58 0.33 4.44 1.49 8.43*** 3.62 
Wu-Hausman-
test1 
3.35 
(0.07) 
    2.14 
  (0.11) 
 6.08 
(0.02) 
 0.04 
(0.83) 
 
Wald-test 31      162  29  40  
Sargan-test2      26.5   (0.97) 
     
AR(1)3     -2.05   (0.03) 
     
AR(2)3      1.00   (0.31) 
     
R2(overall) 0.36    0.36  0.21  
    Note: For the notation of the variables see Table 2. 
          *, **, *** Significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels of significance respectively. 
          The country dummies (Ds-1) and the constant are not reported. 
          1. Test for the endogeneity of risk in the capital equation and vice versa, with 
              p-values in parentheses. 
          2. Test for over-identifying restrictions, with p-values in parentheses. 
          3. First and second order autocovariance in residuals, with p-values in  
              parentheses.                                          
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An interesting finding is the coefficient of the time dummy variable, which suggests 
that in 2009 low capital banks’ risk-taking was affected more than in high equity 
banks. 
 
7.4 Results for high and low regulatory capital banks 
 
 
As shown in Table 8, the estimated equations in both sub-samples represent 
long-run relations, which according to the capital buffer theory can be either positive 
or negative. It is clear that in the sub-sample of banks with relatively high CAR (first 
column) the coefficient on risk, although positive, is not significant. In addition, 
increased profitability and loan losses increase capital but are also insignificant. In 
fact, the positive coefficient of liquidity is the only significant one in this equation. 
However, risk (second column) is affected positively and significantly by capital but 
the size of the effect is small, while it is determined negatively and significantly by 
liquidity and size.  
In the sub-sample of banks with low CAR, the empirical estimations indicate 
that there is a positive and significant one-way relationship between regulatory 
capital and risk.10 One possible explanation of these findings is that, while well 
capitalized banks have completed their adjustments to the target levels of capital, by 
contrast, those banks with relatively lower capitalization continue to adjust their 
target levels of capital either to satisfy minimum capital requirements or to create an 
adequate buffer above them11. However, the opposite holds for risk. High CAR 
banks can increase their risk-taking after increasing their regulatory capital but not 
                                                 
 
10 This result is consistent with that of Rime (2001) for Swiss banks. 
11 This finding is in line with studies by Jacques and Nigro (1997), Rime (2001) and Roy (2008) which 
find that weakly capitalized banks increase their capital faster than well-capitalized banks. 
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the low CAR ones. We further find that, in the low CAR sub-sample, an increase in 
loan loss provisions decreases regulatory capital and increases risk. This is the first 
case where a significant relationship between this variable and regulatory capital and 
risk is observed. 
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Table 8 
          Estimation results for the simultaneous equation model 
    (Banks with high and low regulatory capital) 
 
 
 
Dependent variables 
Banks with high CAR Banks with low CAR 
Capital(CAR) Risk(CAR) Capital(CAR) Risk(CAR) 
Methods 
2SLS-RE 2SLS-RE 2SLS-RE 2SLS-RE 
 
 
 
 
Explanatory 
variables 
coefficient t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. 
CAPt   0.09** 1.81   0.00 -0.01 
CAPt-1         
NPLt 0.10 0.10   0.44** 1.92   
NPLt-1         
ROA 0.54 0.50   0.13 0.32   
LIQ 0.33*** 2.98 -0.09 -1.55 0.03 1.30 0.01 0.47 
LLP 0.41 0.85 -0.32*** -2.18 -0.83** -1.95 0.88*** 3.38 
S -3.52 -0.41 -7.52* 4.56 -2.70 -1.11 -2.03 -0.91 
S2 0.13 0.25 0.41 1.27 0.14 0.96 0.10 0.78 
GDPR -0.55 -0.33 0.99* 1.75 -0.06 -0.26 0.20 1.28 
EBRD 1.94 0.18 -5.80 -1.06 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.87 
D9 -1.46 -0.89 7.44 1.22 -0.11 -0.04 4.02*** 2.33 
Wu-Hausman-
test1 
2.98 
(0.09) 
 2.78 
(0.10) 
 3.35 
(0.07) 
 8.62 
(0.00) 
 
Wald-test 28  46  18  50  
R2(overall) 0.35  0.30  0.17  0.36  
 Note: For the notation of the variables see Table 2. 
          *, **, *** Significance  at the 1, 5 and 10% levels of significance respectively. 
          The country-dummies (Ds-1) and the constant are not reported. 
1. Test for the endogeneity of risk in the capital equation and vice versa, with 
p- values in parentheses.    
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8. Conclusions  
 
This paper has analyzed the relationship between bank capital and risk in the 
SEE region. To examine the impact of both micro-and macroeconomic environment 
and, specifically, the last crisis on banks’ choice of capital and risk, we estimated a 
dynamic equations system assuming that choices of capital and risk are made 
simultaneously within each bank. 
The study indicates that the SEE countries need a stable, healthy and efficient 
banking system in order to finance private and public investment and consumption. 
As shown in the analysis, continued financial reform and improvement in the 
structure of banks in the SEE countries over the last decade have contributed to high 
levels of equity and regulatory capital without altering systematically their behavior 
towards risk.  
The results for the whole sample of banks show that there is a one-way 
relatively weak but significant relationship between the capital adequacy ratio and 
risk-taking but not vice versa. This finding can be explained by the fact that on 
average banks in the SEE region keep their target level of capital above the 
regulation requirements and is in line with the charter value theory. In the equity 
capital equation, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable implies a relatively 
quick adjustment to target, while risk has a negative and significant impact on equity 
capital. 
In contrast, the estimation results for banks with low equity capital and a low 
CAR identify a positive and significant two-way relationship between regulatory 
capital and risk for equity capital and one-way relationship for regulatory capital. In 
the remaining two sub-samples this relation is positive but insignificant. 
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Additionally, in the four sub-samples, the empirical results suggest that there is a 
negative relationship between equity capital and risk, which is marginally significant 
in the risk equation for high equity capital banks case only. These results show first 
that: First, less-than adequately capitalized banks raise their target regulatory capital 
after an increase in risk in order to cover potential losses while in turn engage in 
riskier activities. And, second, banks differentiate in their choices between equity 
capital, regulatory capital and risk. 
We find a significant and positive (negative) influence of liquidity (liquidity 
risk) on regulatory capital in the whole sample of banks and in the four sub-samples 
with the exception of banks with a low CAR, indicating that high levels of liquidity 
lead to increasing CAR in order to control for risk. This is confirmed by the negative 
impact of this variable on risk which is marginally significant in the whole sample 
case only. Hence, in cases where regulatory capital and risk are not related (high 
CAR banks), liquidity has a strong positive impact on capital. This seems to suggest 
that in the case of high capitalized banks with target capital higher than the 
regulatory one, an increase in the liquidity risk will increase capital, but this does not 
translate into a significant reduction of risk. Also, liquidity has a negative (positive), 
albeit insignificant, effect on equity capital and risk. 
Profitability seems to have a significant positive influence on equity capital 
only in the case of banks with low equity capital, but does not have any significant 
effect on regulatory capital in all the cases considered.  
Banks with higher loan losses appear to raise CAR and reduce risk in the 
whole sample and in the high equity capital and high CAR (significantly) sub-
sample cases, but decrease regulatory capital and raise risk in the low equity and 
CAR (significantly) sub-samples. The estimated coefficient of this variable on equity 
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capital and risk equations is positive but insignificant, with the exception of its 
impact on risk in the low equity sub-sample. It seems that banks with both larger 
equity and CAR have the capacity to raise capital and reduce risk whenever loan 
losses occur. With regard to size, larger banks will hold less regulatory capital in the 
low equity sub-sample banks and reduce risk taking in the whole sample and in the 
high equity banks sub-sample. On the other hand, size has not a significant influence 
on equity capital. The influence of GDP growth on capital (both regulatory and 
equity) appears to be negative in all cases but significant only in the CAR equation 
in the high equity sub-sample of banks. This finding indicates the procyclical nature 
of economic activity, although it is important in high equity banks only. On the 
contrary, the impact of this variable on risk is positive. Finally, reforms in the 
banking sector seem to affect significantly equity capital only. This influence is 
positive (negative) in the high (low) equity sub-sample of banks. 
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APPENDIX 
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Figure 1 
Real GDP Growth in SEE
2007 2008
2009
Source:EBRD(2010):"Transition Report 2009"
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